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Producers, rural government
officials, lenders and policy makers are
all asking the question, "Have land
prices hit bottom?" One approach to
answering this question is to compare
observed land prices in the actual land
market with those prices based on
current returns being earned from
farmlands Because of the large
government payments associated with the
Food Security Act of 1985, an additional
question must be asked, "How much of the
current price of land is associated with
government payments rather than current
market prices for grain?"
In this Newsletter issue, estimates
of land prices for a cash grain farm
with and without farm program payments
are presented. These potential farmland
prices are estimated under three crop
scenarios, namely, those involving
bumper, average and poor yields. Prices
used in the analysis reflect market
outlook and government policies as of
August 1986.
Basic Farm Being Analyzed
The 640 acre farm used in this
analysis has 600 acres of tillable land
used for production. The ASCS base
yields represent the average yield.esti
mates in the analysis. These per-acre
yields are 75 bushels for corn and
oats, 30 bushels for soybeans and 3 tons
for alfalfa (Table 1). Three yield
scenarios are specified, with "biimper"
and "poor" yields being 33 percent above
and below base yields, respectively.
Because the government program
requires acreage to be setaside for
program crops, the total number of acres
farmed will be less than 600 acres. In
this case study, 80 acres are idled
(Table 1). Government participation will
reduce the amount of grain the producer
will have available to sell under each
crop scenario. Government participation
will also reduce the costs directly
related to crop production, while not
altering the fixed costs for the farming
operation. A more detailed discussion
of the farm program and cost structure
of this farm is presented in Economics
Staff Paper 86-6 "Land Prices: An
Estimate Based on the Capitalized Value
Approach."
Production Practices and
Direct Production Costs
The production practices and direct
costs are based on South Dakota Exten
sion Service publication Expected
Production Costs for Major Crops in
South Dakota for the East-Central region
dated October 1985. Background research
by the authors was conducted to update
the cost estimates to summer 1986 cost
levels.
Actual cost levels for a specific
producer may differ from the estimates
shown in the Newsletter because of
differences in management, equipment and
financing. For example, the producer is
assumed to use a six month operating
loan, at 13.50 percent to finance, direct
production costs (i.e. costs which vary
with the acreage planted and yield
levels). If a producer does not use
this type of loan, the produer would
increase the amount of cash available
for land payments as much as $5.78 per
acre for corn or as little as $3.11 per
acre for alfalfa.
Price and Revenue Outlook
The price scenario used assumes
that there will be no further cut in
Table 1: Basic Price and Acreage Information Required for the
Analysis.
Corn Oats Soybeans Alfalfa
A. Without Program
B. With Program
Base Acreages
300 100 150
240 80 150
50
50
Projected Per-Acre Crop yields Under Scenarios
(bu.)
100
75
50
(bu.)
100
75
50
(bu.)
4
3
2
C. Bumper Yield
D. Average Yield
E. Poor Yield
(bu.)
40
30
20
F. Cash Price
G. Support Price
Projected Crop Prices
$1.60 $0.80
$1.75 $0.89
$4.50
$4.65
$35.00
N.A.
government support prices (Table 1).
The reduction of the national soybean
support price from $5.02 to $4.77
resulted in a $4.65 soybean support
price being used in the analysis. The
reductions associated with Gramm-Rudman
were not incorporated into the analysis.
Such reductions reduce government
payments--thereby forcing land market
prices lower.
The average cash price used in the
analysis is based on an expectation that
not all the crop will be marketed in the
fall. Also, producers are expected to
receive slightly less than the maximum
feasible deficiency payment for the com
and oats. This assvimes the national
average price will average slightly
above the support price for the year.
If large crops in the Southern
Hemisphere become reality, the cash
price scenario selected will be too
optimistic.
Two Levels of Residual Returns
Fixed costs are those costs that do
not vary with changes in the level of
yields or acreage planted. Also, parti
cipation in the government program does
not alter these costs. Fixed costs
include depreciation, insurance, utili
ties, real estate taxes, interest on
machinery investment, family labor and
management. In the calculation of
fixed costs, the machinery investment
consisted entirely of USED equipment
with a total value of $43,430. The
producer was assiimed to require a 13.50
percent rate of return on this machinery
investment. New equipment for this farm
would have required an investment of
between $160,000 and $200,000. If an
assTjmption of new equipment had been
made in the analysis, the depreciation
and interest expense on the machinery
investment would have been significantly
higher.
Another major fixed cost was the
return for management and family labor.
The return for management and farm labor
was assumed to be $20,000.
To analyze the sensitivity of the
estimated land price to the management
and family labor cost assumption, two
levels of cost recovery were specified.
With the first level, all direct produc
tion and fixed costs except for the
$20,000 allocated to management and
family labor were subtracted from the
farm's total revenues. With the second
level, all direct production and fixed
costs, including the return for manage
ment and family labor, were subtracted.
The estimated cash residual after deduc
ting the specified costs was considered
to be allocated to the farmland.
Cash Flow Available per Acre
Average levels of cash flow
available per acre based on 640 acres
are reported for the two fixed cost
recovery levels under each yield
scenario (Table 2). With the bxiaper
crop scenario, cash residuals for both
levels of fixed cost recovery and both
government program scenarios are
positive. The poor crop scenario
^ income levels were low or negative in
all the scenarios.
Estimated Land Value
The estimated capitalization value
of this land was found by dividing the
estimated cash flow by a specified
interest rate. The interest rate
selected was 10.5 percent. This
interest rate is approximately equal to
the Federal Land Bank interest rate
charged their above-average credit risk
customers. If the interest rate avail
able to the farmland buyer is lower, the
capitalized value of the land would be
higher.
In the summer of 1986, land of the
productive quality discussed in this
analysis was selling in the range of
$280 to $375 per acre. If producers or
investors are basing their purchase
decision on an average yield and the
current farm program continuing, the
current price is consistent with the
producer receiving some return to used
machinery and management. But this
return is clearly not sufficient to
equal the specified 13.5 percent return
on the machinery investment and $20,000
for management and family labor.
Have Land Prices Bottomed?
Have land prices bottomed? If the
producer could expect a bumper crop
yield every year and continued funding
of the federal farm program at current
levels, the answer would be yes.
However, if expectations are for average
yields or reduced government support,
the answer would be no.
The parentheses in Table 2 imply
negative cash flows and negative land
values based on the capitalization
approach. In such cases, the losses may
be minimized by not farming the land.
Agricultural land with poor productivity
may be simply abandoned. Although
productive land may suffer the loss of
Table 2: Projected Cash Flow Available per Acre and Capitalized Land
Prices With and Without Che Farm Program for Three Specified
urop Scenarios
Crop Scenario
With Without
Farm Farm
Program Program Difference
CASH FLOW AVAILABLE PER ACRE
1. No Return to Farmer for Management and Farm Labor
A. Bumper Yield $70.11 $45.72
Average Yiled $39.15 513.45
Poor Yield $ 3^22 ($24.83)
2.Return to Management and Farm Labor Included as a Cost
A. Bumper Yield $38.86 $14.47
?• ($20.80)C. Poor Yield ($23.03) 56 08
B.
C.
$24.39
$28.71
$33.05
$24.39
$28.71
$33.05
CAPITALIZED LAND PRICES
3.. No Return to Farmer for Management and Farm Labor
A, Bumper Yield ^435
c' Poor?'oor Yield j 7g ($236)
And Farm Labor Included as a Cost
A. Bumper Yield $373
B. Average Yield
('219) ($53!!
$233
$273
$314
$232
$273
$315
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additional value, less productive land
may result in an investment that is
essentially worthless.
A poor crop in a local region and
continued excess national grain produc
tion would imply significant downward
pressure on land prices. Potential cash
flow difficulties would exist even with
the current level of government support,
if a producer were using newer equipment
and had a moderate level of leverage.
The capitalization approach used does
not allow any net income for principal
payments.
Preview of the Future
Agricultural land is the residual
holder of the profitability of agricul
ture. During the late 1970's and early
1980's, producers were willing to invest
a significant portion of their reserve
investment funds in farmland. Producers
in the last part of the 1980's are
probably going to be less willing to
utilized this management strategy. Their
desire to diversify their investments
may limit any upward pressure on land
values by producers. Offsetting this
trend is the fact that the amount of
investment capital required to purchase
a tract of land of a specific size has
declined.
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The Food Security Act of 1985
contains clear indications of lower
future government support for agricul
ture. The Act contains provisions for
reducing target support prices in 1988.
Also, the potential exists for further
reductions in support loan prices. If
grain carryovers are not reduced, this
will imply further reductions in the
cash prices received, by producers.
These developments would imply a
continued downward pressure on land
values.
Interest rates and agricultural
input prices have all been declining in
the past two years. If interest rates
and agricultural input prices start to
increase, the profitability of land
ownership will decline further.
In summary, this analysis shows
that those currently purchasing agricul
tural land as an investment appear to be
betting that the federal government is
going to develop a farm program, which
will improve market prices above current
levels or maintain current payment
levels. They appear, also, to be betting
that the U.S. government and other
governments will achieve a coordinated
economic policy that will result in real
growth in the world economy and
increased international trade for U.S.
agriculture during the 1990's. Finally,
they could be betting on further
declines in the level of interest rates.
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